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May It Please the Court
by David F. Forte

M

ay it please the court.
So the advocate begins…with a
prayer. What is it that the counselor prays may please the court? We know
that what pleases a legislator is having enough
votes. What pleases a governor or president is
having his orders obeyed. But what pleases a
court is its being convinced of the rightness of
the cause. The court wants reason, reason that
persuades.
In the Anglo-American scheme of justice,
more than any other, courts must give reasons
for their judgment. They have to justify their
conclusions before all. They are obliged to be
transparent in reaching the conclusion that
will change the lives or fortunes of those before them. Having enough votes is not a sufficient justification. Having the prerogative of
executive decision is not enough for the judges.
As Alexander Hamilton noted, judges have no
power of the purse. They have no army. Their
only weapon is the reasons they proffer.
Hadley Arkes offers a brilliant manifesto
for natural law. In it, he suggests that judges do
not pay enough attention to reason, that their
realm of reason is too circumscribed—and he
levels the criticism at both modern liberal and
conservative judges. He urges them to reach
out specifically to the principles of the natural
law. Yet the judges resist the invitation. They
seem always to have resisted the invitation.
Why is that so? Why are natural law reasons resisted? Arkes asks. Why do judges not
seek a proper grounding of their judgment in
natural law?
Two Kinds of Natural Law

W

hen arkes speaks of natural law,
he does so in two forms, though in
his narrative, he seems to collapse
the two. In one, which we may call “right reason,” Arkes speaks to the “nature of the thing.”
Thus, he says, John Marshall reasoned in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) that the power given by the Constitution to the federal government to establish something must necessarily
and logically include the power to preserve it.
Article I, Section 8 provides Congress with
the power “To establish Post Offices and Post
Roads.” One does not need an explicit grant
of the power in the Constitution to say that
Congress has the power to protect the mails,
through punitive legislation. It inheres in the
nature of the grant of power, that is, “in the

nature of the thing.” This form of demonstration, or right reason, is implicit in the art of
judging. In fact, this form of demonstration
does often please the court, and it should.
Arkes himself notes that even the conservative justices, whom he otherwise criticizes,
often correctly use this form of natural law,
i.e., right reason. So, for example, Arkes applauds Justice Scalia’s employment of principles of “propositional logic” when he disputes
Justice Kennedy’s definition that whatever “affects” waters is itself “waters within the United States” (as defined in the Clean Water Act
and its subsequent regulations and judicial
interpretations).
But there is another aspect to the natural
law that Arkes describes, which we may call
moral axioms. It is here where he finds the
conservative justices falling short. He regrets
it when a court has an opportunity to base its
decision on moral axioms and instead turns to
original understanding or other devices. Thus
in District of Columbia v. Heller (2008), establishing the right to bear arms as an individual
right under the Second Amendment, Arkes
criticizes Justice Scalia for considering the
right of self-preservation not as a moral axiom
applied to the human person as such, but as
a principle that was in the positive law of the
Constitution. The right of self-preservation
can be a ground for the decision, according
to Scalia, because it is part of the original understanding, not because it is a principle that
supervenes the Constitution itself.
Scalia recoils from the use of moral first
principles as a basis for judicial decision-making. He has opined,
Maybe my very stingy view, my very
parsimonious view, of the role of natural
law and Christianity in the governance
of the state comes from the fact that I
am a judge, and it is my duty to apply
the law. And I do not feel empowered
to revoke those laws that I do not consider good laws. If they are stupid laws,
I apply them anyway, unless they go so
contrary to my conscience that I must
resign.
And so, here, Arkes is correct in the observation that forms the basis of his regret.
It is the enunciation of moral axioms as the
ground of decision that does not please the
court. Justice Scalia, of course, is not alone. In
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fact, he is heir to a long and articulate tradition, which Professor Arkes knows very well.
But what animates this tradition? Why are
otherwise wise, intelligent, and morally acute
judges so averse to going outside the positive
law to search for first principles, as Arkes
urges them to do? The answer is that the positive law itself binds the judge within a moral
framework, and Anglo-American judges find
that moral framework sufficient unto itself.
The Nature of Positive Law

T

o understand the tension between
the moral imperatives of the natural
law and the way judges come to actual
decisions, we need to complete our picture.
We need to see what the actual moral experience of judging is, not just what it would be if
confined to propositional logic.
Of all the founders, Hamilton best understood the nature of judging. In Federalist 78
he described the Constitution’s tripartite division of powers. He ascribed “FORCE ” to the
executive, “WILL” to the legislature, and the
more circumspect “JUDGMENT ” to the judiciary. He said that the judiciary would be the
least dangerous branch. Why would it be the
least dangerous branch? As Hamilton’s AntiFederalist opponents asked, do not judges in
robes have the same passion for power as do
congressmen in frock coats?
Hamilton agreed with James Madison that
mere parchment barriers would not keep the
judges from abusing the rights of others. Nor
did he rely upon the force of philosophic logic
to restrain the judge. And Hamilton and the
framers intentionally left the courts free from
most of the checks placed on the other departments of government, precisely to leave
the judiciary independent. If not parchment
rules, if not the force of philosophical logic, if
not checks and balances, what then can we
rely upon to restrain judges?
Hamilton, joined by the other framers,
has an answer: it is virtue. The particular kind
of virtue that inheres in the positive law of the
court. Through the moral matrix of the positive law, the judge learns the art of virtue, literally the Aristotelian habit of acting rightly.
Everywhere a judge turns, he is bound by the
instructive moral limits of his craft. Let us
consider them.
There is, to begin, the positive law of statutes, of administrative regulations, and of
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executive orders. Quoting St. Augustine, St.
Thomas Aquinas writes that “In these earthly laws, though men judge about them when
they are making them, when once they are
established and passed, the judges may judge
no longer of them, but according to them.”
Thus the courts are bound by rules of statutory interpretation. By respecting the authority of the legislature and the executive, the
courts affirm the political legitimacy of those
branches that have a closer accountability to
the people. Courts that are faithful to the
positive law of statutes thereby strengthen
the legitimacy of the polity.
A second element in the moral matrix of
positive law is the law of the court, or the rules
of precedent or stare decisis. Precedent operates as a form of judicially created statute,
which, like a legislative statute, is binding but
which still must be interpreted. There is, to
be sure, a lively contemporary debate over
whether incorrect interpretations of the Constitution should be maintained under the rule
of stare decisis. Whatever the correct resolution of that conflict should be in particular
cases, it is nonetheless telling that the debate
would have no traction at all if precedent did
not have a binding function on courts.
There is an additional parallel between the
law of statutes and the law of precedents: both
direct a judge’s attention to what has gone before. Both testify to the fact that the law that
comes to the judge is de lege lata, something
already laid down, as opposed to de lege ferenda, law as it ought to be. Thus do both the
law of statutes and the law of the court channel the judge away from subjective preferences.
We should mention here that part of the law
of the court is the law of judicial system, by
which lower courts follow the rules laid down
by superior courts within their jurisdiction.
The system provides consistency and coherence in the law throughout the country in its
thousands of applications.
A third element is the law of process, which
limits what a court can hear, what evidence
may be admitted, and how a court may dispense legal justice. As every law student
learns—and what every lawyer and judge
knows—courts may not choose what issues to
decide. They are limited to cases, which means
that there must be a plaintiff (or petitioner), a
defendant (or respondent) and a legal cause of
action. The parties must have standing, the issue must be ripe, must not be moot, and the
court must have jurisdiction.
A fourth element of the law is the positive
law of the subject, or legal doctrine. Every legal
dispute is brought in one or more subject area,
each of which has its own complex concepts,
standards, and history. Each subject—whether it be contract law, tort law, anti-trust law,

tax law, bankruptcy law, divorce law, corporation law, or any of the other myriad substantive subjects taught at law school and continued on in the practice of lawyers—has a coherent and definable content, known in legal
studies as “doctrine.” The vast detail and the
motivating principles in every area provide a
positive law of direct relevance to the resolution of each particular legal dispute.
A fifth element is the positive law of the case,
or res judicata. Once a case has been fully and
completely decided, no court may revise or reopen the litigation. Although the legislature
may change the underlying law and affect the
legal rights of the parties even in an ongoing
case, once the dispute has been resolved judicially, not even a legislative act can change the
rights and duties of the parties decisively determined by the court.
A sixth constraint is the positive law of the
judge, or judicial ethics. The appropriate behavior of judges has been part of Western legal concern for centuries. In the United States,
the American Bar Association first adopted
Canons of Judicial Ethics in 1924. In 1972,
the Canons were revised and redacted into a
Code of Judicial Conduct that served as the
basis for nearly all state codes of judicial conduct. The Code covers such areas of judicial
conduct as compliance with the law, diligence
and impartiality, conflict of interest, and electoral activities. In addition, federal statutes
cover disqualification and recusal of judges.
A seventh element is the positive law of law,
or what makes an enactment truly binding.
For law must have certain internal elements
for it to be law, and not just an arbitrary or
absurd act. The principle of legality was helpfully illuminated in the famous 1958 debate
between Leon Fuller and H.L.A. Hart in the
pages of the Harvard Law Review. Although
Fuller referred to his theory as “internal natural law,” his view is more of a delineation of
the nature of positive law, qua law, and the
outer moral limits of what a judge can enforce as true positive law. For positive law to
be legal, argues Fuller, it needs to have certain
internal attributes: the rules must be general,
publicly promulgated, prospective, clear and
understandable, consistent, capable of being
complied with, relatively stable, and administered faithfully. Without these elements, an
enactment would be void for vagueness, or
for arbitrariness. It simply would not be law.
An eighth ingredient of the moral fabric of
positive law is the law of reason, or more exactly,
the law of reasons. As noted, the Anglo-American legal system’s hallmark is the judge’s moral accountability for his decision, particularly
at the appellate level. He must give reasons,
publicly stated, justifying his decision, open
for criticism and rational impeachment. It is
Claremont Review of Books w Fall 2011
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not enough for the judge to follow the various
elements of the positive law, as outlined above.
He must demonstrate to the people and the
polity that he has been faithful to the positive
law. Not only, therefore, is the judge bound by
the moral constraints of the positive law, he
must be transparently bound.
All of the above impels a judge in the
American legal system to adhere to the law
of the Constitution, which provides the moral
basis for originalism. Professor Arkes has
criticized originalism, partly because it is indeterminate and there are multiple disagreements about what the original understanding is. But if disagreement about the principles of natural law are no logical barrier to
there being a right interpretation of natural
law, so too disagreement about the original
understanding of the Constitution is no barrier to there being a right understanding of
what the founding generation meant by the
words they so laboriously put into the Constitution.
Besides, the moral suasion of originalism
is necessary to the virtue of the judicial craft.
In Marbury v. Madison (1803), Marshall insisted that “[t]he Framers of the Constitution
contemplated [i.e., intended] that instrument
as a rule for the government of courts, as well
as of the legislature.” In words that judges

and academics might well contemplate today, Lloyd Garrison would not let anything continMarshall said,
gent stand in the way of his categorical imperative. Garrison was the advocate of moral absoWhy, otherwise, does the Constitution
lutism, while Lincoln was the true originalist.
direct judges to take an oath to support
Many of us are familiar with a scene in
it? This oath certainly applies in an esRobert Bolt’s play A Man for All Seasons, in
pecial manner to their conduct in their
which Thomas More engages his son-in-law
official behavior [i.e., their judicial craft].
William Roper in a debate over the problem
How immoral to impose it on them if
of too many positive laws standing in the way
they were to be used as the instruments,
of getting at what’s right.
and the knowing instruments for violating what they swear to support.”
Roper: So, now you give the Devil the
benefit of law!
Judicial Craft
More: Yes! What would you do? Cut a
great road through the law to get after
he judge who faithfully abides by
the Devil?
the positive law in all the ways outlined
above performs a rationally moral task
Roper: Yes, I’d cut down every law in
without the need to refer to natural law prinEngland to do that!
ciples that lie at the base of law’s function, and,
in many cases, of law’s substance. This is the
More: Oh? And when the last law was
phronesis of the judge, the practical wisdom,
down, and the Devil turned ’round
the virtue of prudence. Prudence does not
on you, where would you hide, Roper,
mean, “let’s compromise until the time is ripe
the laws all being flat? This country is
for getting what we want.” Prudence is the abilplanted thick with laws, from coast to
ity to do what is optimally right in a situation of
coast, Man’s laws, not God’s! And if you
contingent variables. It is not what is temporarcut them down, and you’re just the man
ily right. It is right in the moment of deciding
to do it, do you really think you could
what is right. Abraham Lincoln, let it be restand upright in the winds that would
membered, practiced prudence, while William
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blow then? Yes, I’d give the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety’s sake!
What would happen if we cut down the
positive laws of the judge to get at the moral
axioms? What would happen if we put the
axe to the rules of statutory interpretation,
or to stare decisis, or to res judicata, or to the
rules of due process, or to judicial and legal
ethics, or to legal doctrine, or to the principle
of legality, or to the justification by reason, or
to originalism? What would happen if we did
that? What would we do then when the Devil
turned ’round on us?
We’d get the wages of what the legal realists did to the traditional moral constraints
of judging, when they urged judges to follow
WILL and not JUDGMENT. We’d get Roe
v. Wade (1973) and over 40 million dead human beings.
The problem with Roe v. Wade is not that
it violated the norms of natural law. Cer-

tainly it did so manifestly. The true problem
with Roe v. Wade is that it did not follow
the ethical norms of positive law of the court.
In that case, Justice Blackmun violated the
law of the court by ignoring the tradition of
cases opposed to such an innovative “right.”
He violated the principle of legality by proposing a rule that had little internal consistency.
He violated the law of reason, for the opinion
was simply a diktat declaring a result that
had no colorable reasoning behind it with a
flippant disregard of the norms of justification and transparency. Blackmun violated
the positive law of the Constitution, for there
was no privacy right encompassing abortion
in the original understanding of liberty or
in any reasonable application of the original
understanding.
Roe v. Wade is not just censurable because it violates natural law. It is censurable
because Justice Blackmun violated the most
fundamental moral norms of the positive law,

prompting the famous observation of John Ely,
“It is…a very bad decision…because it is bad
constitutional law, or rather because it is not
constitutional law and gives almost no sense
of an obligation to try to be.”
The natural law song has many notes. Thus
I suggest that the renewed natural law project
can succeed if we take the categorical imperatives of Kant, and place them in the practical
wisdom of Aristotle, within the prudence of
Aquinas, and come to see the phenomenological vibrancy of the morality of the judicial
craft itself.
May it please the court.
David F. Forte is a professor of law at the Cleveland-Marshall College of Law and an acting municipal judge in Lakewood, Ohio. Portions of this
essay were drawn from an article in A Second
Look at First Things: A Case for Conservative
Politics, edited by Francis J. Beckwith, et al. (St.
Augustine’s Press).

The Need for Natural Law
by Michael M. Uhlmann

I

n hadley arkes’s “manifesto” we have
an elegant restatement of the case for natural law and an elegant summary, as well,
of the ideas that have informed Arkes’s thinking over four decades. It is a fitting inaugural
to the establishment of the Claremont Institute’s new center for the study and application of natural law principles. The Center has
many godfathers, but none more influential
than Harry V. Jaffa. Natural law, it has been
said, always returns to bury its pallbearers,
and few in our time have done more than Professor Jaffa to revive interest in the subject.
We have in David Forte’s response an
equally elegant commentary on why judges—
even judges who are friendly to the idea of natural law as a philosophical proposition—may
be indisposed to acknowledge the authority of
natural law as a guide to adjudication. Professor Forte, no less than Professor Arkes, recognizes the limits of legal positivism; but he also
reminds us that positive law has moral virtues
that natural law enthusiasts are sometimes
prone to disregard. As Forte puts it, “We
need to see what the actual moral experience
of judging is, not just what it would be if confined to propositional logic.”
Because I recently wrote at some length, and
favorably, about Professor Arkes’s effort to in-

still a deeper appreciation for the moral logic
that necessarily undergirds all law (“Natural
Law Man,” Winter 2010-Spring 2011 CRB), I
will not further dwell on the matter here. Instead, I would like to offer some observations
on Professor Forte’s response, and then follow
that with a few suggestions regarding the new
center.
Forte suggests that many judges are reluctant to venture beyond the confines of positive law, not because they abjure the importance of morals, but because “the positive law
bounds judges within a moral framework,
and Anglo-American judges find that moral
framework sufficient unto itself.” That moral
framework, he says, may be found by examining various criteria of positive law that guide
judges in their work: the binding authority of
statutory enactments and executive orders;
respect for precedent, the formalities of legal process, and prevalent legal doctrine; the
finality of decisions once rendered; the authority of judicial ethics; “the positive law of
law,” by which is meant certain internal attributes (such as public promulgation, clarity,
and stable administration) that distinguish
law as such from arbitrary diktat; and, finally,
what Forte calls “the law of reasons,” or the
duty to explain, publicly and usually in writClaremont Review of Books w Fall 2011
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ing, the rationale behind decisions. He argues
that these criteria, taken together and rightly
understood, enable a judge to “ply his craft in
consonance with natural law without needing
to give it formal judicial notice.”
There is much to what Forte says, and he is
right that most of these criteria, consciously
or unconsciously, derive from or rely upon
principles of natural-law reasoning. His list
delineates the necessary moral conditions for
the rule of law that binds, or ought to bind,
judges. The question, however, is whether
his list is sufficient. I think it is not, which is
why I am attracted to Arkes’s argument that
we need to be more explicit about the moral
ground of legal reasoning.
The Limits of Positive Law

T

oward the end of his response, forte
quotes a famous passage in Robert
Bolt’s A Man for All Seasons in which
Thomas More instructs his well-meaning but
somewhat impetuous son-in-law about heeding the commands of positive law. I know the
passage well; indeed, A Man for All Seasons is
a staple of one of my courses. More’s statement
is a moving and eloquent defense of the rule
of law, one redolent with themes articulated
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